Kuwaiti detainees at Guantánamo Bay — habeas corpus rulings of the US District Court for the District of Columbia in Al Odah v. United States, No. 02-828 (Kollar-Kotelly J., 2009–2010)

On his own statements and admissions, he was in the mountains near Tora Bora at the height of the battle, armed with a Kalashnikov and in the company of members and leaders of al Qaeda, the Taliban or associated forces actively fighting the United States. The court held on that basis that detention was lawful. It expressly did not reach the government's other allegations — earlier trips and training, association with named al Qaeda leaders, religious instruction, mentoring members of the cell that carried out the attack on Faylaka Island on 8 October 2002, propaganda — finding the evidence for them in equipoise, attenuated, or from unidentified sources. Petition denied.

USE IN A REPORT: the four public opinions are the fullest judicial record of the Kuwaiti detainees' cases. Cite each for what the court found on its own record, and note that allegations the court did not reach remain allegations.

The four rulings came to different results on different evidence, and none of them is a criminal conviction: habeas asks only whether the government has shown, on the balance of probabilities, that detention is authorised. The Al Kandari opinion is sometimes cited for the Faylaka Island allegation; the court expressly declined to decide it. The Al Rabiah opinion is relevant to any report that relies on the US designations of the Kuwaiti Joint Relief Committee and the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society: the court held that a designation made after a person's involvement is no evidence of what that person knew or did at the time. Each opinion is the public version released after classification review, with redactions.

The record was "surprisingly bare": the government had withdrawn most of its evidence and relied almost exclusively on his "confessions", which his own interrogators had repeatedly concluded were not believable, and which repeated information from witnesses who were not credible or from sources "that never even existed". His counsel attributed them to abuse and coercion, "some of which is supported by the record". He had a history of charitable travel: Bosnia (1994–95) for the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, Kosovo (1998) for the Kuwait Red Crescent, Bangladesh (2000) for the Patients Helping Fund.

THE CHARITIES. The government relied on the fact that the Kuwaiti Joint Relief Committee and the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society had been designated by the United States as supporters of terrorism. The court found "no basis" for the inference: the government conceded that neither was designated when he volunteered with them, and there was no evidence that they supported terrorism at that time or that he had any role in or knowledge of terrorism. "The Court does not accept confessions that even the Government's own interrogators did not believe." Petition granted.

The lead petitioner in Rasul. He admitted travelling to Afghanistan in August 2001, asking to meet a Taliban official, being taken to a Taliban-run camp near Kandahar, taking one day of AK-47 training, surrendering his passport, accepting an AK-47 from armed men and remaining in the Tora Bora mountains during the battle until captured by border guards while carrying it. The court found it more likely than not that the camp was Al Farouq and that he "became part of the forces of the Taliban and al Qaeda". Petition denied.

Detained since 2002 without criminal or military-commission charges; detention justified under the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force; two-day merits hearing on 6–7 July 2009 without live testimony. The court credited evidence that his route into Afghanistan was consistent with one used by al Wafa to bring in fighters, that his movement from Kabul toward Khowst was consistent with fighters fleeing toward Tora Bora, and that not having his passport was consistent with al Qaeda procedure. But the government "has at best shown that some of Al Mutairi's conduct is consistent with persons who may have become a part of al Wafa or al Qaida", and there was "nothing in the record beyond speculation" that he did. His own account of his travels lacked credibility, but the government had not met its burden. Petition granted; the government was ordered to take diplomatic steps to facilitate his release.